Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1958

George D. Eyre v. Michael Frank Burdette : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rich & Strong; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Eyre v. Burdette, No. 8829 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3067

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

. ,~ ·- rt-l.~- ·rcc -•.a ' (
llh ,,,'(;~

"'"''

n

l~·'. r.•

w''\

•

"''

.
Qt.C 1. 9 19S8
...

-·\

;~~
IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

FILED
2

GEORGE D. EYRE, Administrator
JUr·J 01958
of the Estate of CECIL DREWER¥-- -------···-···----.
EYRE, deceased,
lerk, Sup"f'j"ffl;--c·;~ri~--&ii~h··~
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs

Case No. 8829

MICHAEL FRANK BURDETTE,
Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RICH & STRONG
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

......

TABLE OF .co·NTENTS

Page
STATEMENTS O:F FACTS ________________________ .__________________

1

ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------- ______ 16
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN HOLDING AS A MATTER O·F LAW THE
DECEASED, CECIL DREWERY EYRE, WAS
A GUEST IN THE BURDETT AUTOMOBILE 16
POINT II. INSTRUCTIOIN NO. 15 PRO·PERLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO CO,NSIDER
ALLEGED SCUFFLING BY DECENDENT
AND ANOTHER O·CCUPANT AS A DEF'EN SE _____________ ------------------------------------------------------ 29
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT PRO·PERLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFINITION
O~F NEG LIGEN CE________________________________________________ 3 1
PO~INT

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
CO·MMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY O·N THE ISSUE OF
INTO·XICA TION ------------------------------------------------ 34

POINT V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
CO~MMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLO·WING THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION
O·F RISK TO BE GIVEN TO THE JURY OIR
IN UNDULY EMPHASIZING THE SAME ______ 3 5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONTENTS (Continued)
Page

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN INSTRUCTNG THE JURY THAT
CONTRBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION BASED ON WILFUL
MISCO,NDUCT AND INTOXICATION_______ 41
C::ONCULSI<:>N ------------------------------------------------------------ ~

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Ames v. Seibert (Ohio) 99 N. E. 2d 905 ___________ 19, 22
Bashor v. Bashor (Colo.) 85 P. 2d 732 ________________ 33
Crawford v. Foster (Cal.) 293 P. 841 _______________ 17
Druzanich v. Criley (Cal.) 122 P. 2d 53 _____________ 18
Esernia v. Overland Moving Co. (Ut.) 115 Ut. 519,
206 P. 2d 621 ___________________________________________________ 3 3, 36, 43
Gillespie v. Rawlings (Cal.) 317 P. 2d 601 .. ___________________ 18
Jensen v. Mower (Ut.) 4 Ut. 2d 336, 294 P. 2d 683 ____ 17
Kruzie v. Sanders (Cal.) 143 P. 2d 704___________________ 17
Melcher v. Adams (Ore.) 146 P. 2d 3 54 ____________________ 24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Miller v. Miller (Ill.) 69 N. E. 2d 878 ________________________ 19
Neyens v. Gehl ( Ia.) 1 5 N .W. 2d 8 88_------------------------- 3 3
Pilcher v. Erny (Kan.) 124 P. 2d 461 _____________________ 19, 24
Ricciuti v. Robinson (Ut.) 2 Ut. 2d 45, 269 P. 2d 282 33
Rindge v. Holbrook (Conn.) 149 A. 231 ______________________ 33
Roberts v. Craig (Cal.) 2 6 8 P. 2d 50 0-------------------------- 18
Russell v. Pigler ( V t . ) 37 A. 2d 40 3________ _____________ ________ 18
Shoemaker v. Floor (Ut.) 117 Ut. 434, 217 P. 2d 382 38
Stack v. Kearnes (Ut.) 118 Ut. 237, 221 P. 2d 594 32, 40
Walker v. Adamson ( Cal.) 70 P. 2d 914 ________________________ 18
1

Whitechat v. Guyette (Cal.) 122 P. 2d 47-------------------- 18
Wittrock v. Newcom (Ia.) 277 N. W. 286 _________.:________ 18

TEXTS
4 Blashfield Cyclopepdia of Automobile Law and Practice, Part 1, Sec. 2 32 2------------------------------------------·-------- 34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE D. EYRE, Administrator
of the Estate of CECIL DREWERY
EYRE, deceased,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs

Case No. 8829

MICHAEL FRANK BURDETTE,

Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case as tried below involved two separate actions
-one by George D. Eyre, Administrator of Cecil Drewery Eyre, deceased, and the other by Lorene Massardi.
Both Eyre and Massardi were riding in the defendant's
vehicle at the time of the accident. Both actions were
consolidated for trial and tried before a jury. Massardi
admitted that she was a guest, but plaintiff Eyre claimed
that he was a passenger for hire. The court ruled that
Eyre also was a guest. Each plaintiff alleged that the
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defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct and of intoxication. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant
in both cases. Massardi accepted the verdict. The only
appeal is by Eyre.
Eyre was killed in a series of accidents involving the
defendant's vehicle at about 6275 So. Redwood Road in
Salt Lake County on Sept. 22, 1956 at about 7:19 P.M.
(R. 2). The action was brought on behalf of the heirs,
Iole Eyre, widow, and three children, Russell, age 31;
Douglas, age 27; and Pat, age 2 5, all of whom were married and living away from home (R. 1, 264-275~. Mr.
Eyre was seriously injured in October, 1953, as a result
of which he was permanently crippled. He received the
sum of $6,500.00 in settlement for permanent disability
on account of this accident from the California Industrial Commission some time in June of 195 5 (R. 268-269).
So far as Mrs. Eyre knew, Eyre didn't work following this
injury (R. 269). Eyre and his wife quarreled about how
the money was to be invested and Mrs. Eyre left her husband and moved into an apartment (R. 270) . On August
5, 19 55, Mrs. Eyre filed divorce proceedings in California
against her husband, claiming that he had treated her in a
cruel and inhuman manner. (Ex. D-25, R. 277-280).
An interlocutory decree was entered on September 23,
19 5 5, requiring the defendant to pay Mrs. Eyre alimony
of One Dollar per month. The decree also provided that
a final judgment could not be entered until one year from
the entry of the interlocutory decree and that such final
judgment would not be entered until requested by one of
the parties (Ex. D-26, R. 280-281). The year would
have expired the day following the accident. No final

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

judgment had, therefore, been entered. Mrs. Eyre could
not state whether she intended to make the decree final
or not (R. 271). She admitted that she and her husband
had separated about five or six times before the divorce,
the shortest period for possibly two weeks and the longest,
about six months (R. 264.) She said that all of the separations and the eventual divorce were caused by her husband's drinking and quarrels resulting therefrom (R.
274). Prior to their separation they split fifty-fifty the
money which Eyre received for his permanent disability
on account of the industrial accident (R. 275). From the
time of their separation in July 19 55 to the date of her
husband's death she never saw him again and they never
corresponded with one another (R. 275 -276). She admitted that her husband never paid her any money, not
even the One Dollar a month alimony, from the time of
the separation down to the time of his death (R. 276).
Mrs. Eyre was employed, earning $5 6.00 a week and
had been so employed since 1941 (R. 272-273). Her husband was good natured when he wasn't drinking, but
uwhen he was drinking he was inclined to be quarrelsome"
(R. 265, 266).
Massardi was introduced to the defendant as the
wife of Eyre (R. 300) and Massardi admitted that she had
gone out with him since about June or July of 19 56. They
had planned on selling the chickens, going to California,
and getting married as soon as Eyre's divorce was final
(R. 239). At the time of the accident Massardi was living
at the American Motel and registered under the name of
Mrs. Cecil Drewery Eyre (R. 240) . Eyre was 51 at
the time of his death (R. 263). After separating from
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his wife, Eyre raised some chickens on a farm owned by
his sister in Draper (R. 272) .
Massardi said that she and Eyre customarily went out
to his sister's ranch in Draper every night to feed the
chickens and gather eggs. Sometimes they went out twice
a day. When they went into the B Z Bon the day of the
accident, they were enroute to the ranch. (R. 2 3 8) .
After they had been in the BZB awhile, Massardi mentioned they had better go because it was getting late,
meaning that they still had to feed the chickens and gather
the eggs the same as they did every night. Eyre had mentioned something to Burdett about selling him some eggs
at a good price. When they left the B Z B, she and Eyre
started to walk over to Eyre's car. The defendant left
the tavern with them. His car was parked next to Eyre's.
Massardi udidn't know at that time Mr. Burdett had a
car." When they got to the cars, according to Massardi,
Burdett said ((Let's go in mine," and so they got in his car
( R. 2 3 0) . Massardi testified as follows ( R. 2 3 8) :
uQ. Now, Mrs. Massardi, about these eggs, you
and Mr. Eyre customarily went out there every
night and got eggs and brought them in, did you
not, and fed the chickens?

A. Yes, -

Sometimes went twice a day.

Q. That is what you intended on doing when
you left this B Z B, you were going out to feed
the chickens and gather eggs.

A. That is zuhat we intended doing when -u·c
went to the B Z B, zucnt to get crates to put the
eggs i 11 1uhc 11 zuc gathered tbe 111.
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Q. When you left, Mr. Burdett was with you
and Mr. Eyre and you started over to Mr. Eyre's
car, and Mr. Burdett asked if you would go 1n
his car, is that correct?
A. He said ((let's go in my car."

Q. That is all you know about the transaction
going out there, you intended going out in you1,.
own car and bringing the eggs back in?
A. That is all I know."
In addition to Massardi, the defendant was the only
one who testified regarding the eggs. Defendant worked
regularly at Eimco Corporation and had completed his
work there on the day of the accident at 3 : 0 0 P.M.
(R. 297). He worked part time as a bar tender at the B Z B
Tavern, but had no regular working hours there (R. 296297). He checked every night to see if they wanted him.
After finishing his regular work on the day of the accident he went to the B Z B Tavern to see if he was to work
that night (R. 29 8) . He arrived there about 4: 3 0 P.M.
The proprietor was not there. He waited for him and
while doing so, saw Eyre and Massardi. He went over
and Eyre introduced Massardi as his wife ( R. 29 9-3 0 0) •
Massardi and Eyre were drinking beer and had a bottle
in a wrapper on the floor. Defendant had two short
beers with them (R. 300-301).
During the conversation Eyre said he had some eggs
for sale. The defendant said he ucouldn't use too many."
The defendant and another bar tender agreed to take
half a case between them and when the· proprietor came
in, he indica ted he would take half a case ( R. 3 0 1 ) • Eyre
indicated that he and Massardi uwere going out to get
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the eggs." They had to feed the chickens. The eggs
were to be delivered at the B Z B. Nothing was ever said
about the defendant going out to get the eggs. As they
were leaving, Eyre asked the defendant if he would like
to go along. The defendant said he had some free time
and would go. Eyre's car was by the door; the defendant's
was around the corner. Defendant asked whose car they
would go in, and mentioned that he had a full tank of gas,
and they went in his car. He testified he had no other
reason for going out there ((other than to look at the
chicken farm," at Eyre's invitation (R. 303). He also
testified that until Eyre invited him to go out to see the
chickens, he was going home. Eyre never paid him for
the ride. (R. 312).
The defendant was questioned about his testimony
given in a former hearing and the substance of this testimony is set forth in the appellant's brief. However,
Eyre's attorney did not read all of the testimony and the
additional testimony was brought out on redirect examination as follows (R. 3 51):

uQ. Mr. Burdett, counsel, Mr. Black, questioned you about your conversation about the eggs,
but he didn't read you all of the testimony that was
given at the previous hearing to which he referred,
and I will ask you to state if this was also the testimony which you gave at the hearing to which counsel questioned you and if this is not part of the
same conversation-this is at the bottom of page 8.

uA. Well, Mr. Eyre, he asked if I would like
to accompany them out to the ra1tch to get the

eggs. I

didn'~ have anything pressing at the time

to do, so I told him I would be glad to and then I
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asked him, (which car shall we take? Shall we go
in mine or shall we go in yours,' and he said they
would go in my car?"
Is that what you testified about at the prior hearing?
. ''
A . Y es s1r.
The defendant testified that the price of the eggs
was agreed upon and that whether the defendant went in
his car or whether he went in Eyre's car or whether each
went in his own car had no effect upon the price quoted
(R. 3 51).
When they reached the farm in Draper, the defendant
actually gathered all of the eggs and, in addition, fed the
chickens while Massardi and Eyre sat out in the car (R.
307-308).
The highway both north and south of Bennion Hill
is about as described in the plaintiff's brief. The weather
was clear. It was dark (R. 191, 223, 309). The posted
speed limit at the scene of the accident was 50 mph.
(R. 320).
In support of the allegation of wilful misconduct,
the plaintiffs offered testimony of certain witnesses to
prove that the defendant's vehicle had been driven in an
erratic manner and at an excessive speed up the south slope
of Bennion Hill. Ed Jones and Clarence Lovendahl were
in a vehicle which was preparing to enter the highway
from a driveway on the east. Both testified that a
light-colored Ford automobile passed going north. Jones
estimated its speed at 60 to 70 miles per hour (R. 77). Lovendahl guessed the speed of this car at 70 miles per hour,
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but readily admitted he was not a good judge of speed
(R. 186-187). Both admitted that they did not actually
see the accident. ( R. 18 3, 18 7) . Jones said it would
be impossible to say that the vehicle which passed them
was the defendant's car. (R. 183). Lovendahl likewise admitted that he could not identify the defendant's
car as being the one whose movements he had observed.
(R. 187). Both stated that the car which they observed
went clear over to the west side of the road toward a
cement culvert as it reached the brow of the hill (R. 183,
187). Jones indicated that the car which he observed
was not passing any northbound cars (R. 182).
As a matter of fact, the defendant's car had actually
passed two cars on the hill and was not more than a foot
over the center line as it completed the passing of the last
car and was not more than a foot over the center line
as it went over the brow of the hill. Green testified that
he was proceeding north and approaching the south side
of Bennion Hill. He had just reached the point where
the northbound road widened out into two lanes when the
defendant's car passed him and then went back onto its
own side of the road (R. 189) . Perry was traveling north
up the south side of Bennion Hill. As he approached the
crest of the hill, he was traveling in the outside northbound
lane when the defendant's car passed him in the inside
lane. In so doing the defendant's car did not go more
than a foot over the center line and was not more than a
foot over the center line as it went over the hill (R. 201).
Regarding the actions of the defendant's car as it
reached the crest of the hill and started down the north
slope, Perry said that the defendant's car continued down
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the hill on its own side of the road and then veered to the
left just before the impact with the Giorgio car (R. 196197). He admitted that it was dark and that all of the
cars had their headlights burning (R. 191) and claimed
that the impact occurred in the southbound lane. He
admitted that he was a half a city block away when the
collision occurred and his observations were made from
this point (R. 196, 197).
Green testified that when he reached the top of the
hill going north, the defendant's car was then on its own
side of the road going down the hill. It looked to him
like it barely edged to the east and then edged back and
struck the Giorgio car (R. 189, 190). He admitted that
he got to the brow of the hill just in time to see the accident (R. 19 5); that it was dark at the time (R. 194) and
that at the time of the collision he was not quite a Salt
Lake City block away (R. 193, 194).
Gary Hensley and Fred H. Bailey were traveling south
on Redwood Road. (R. 219, 223). Hensley was about 40
to 60 feet behind the Giorgio car at the time of the accident (R. 221), yet he could not tell which vehicle was
on the wrong side of the road at the time of the accident
(R. 222). Bailey was not quite a city block north of the
accident when the collision took place between the Giorgio
and the defendant's vehicles (R. 225). He said the distance was so great that he couldn't tell on which side of
the road or where with reference to the center the accident
occurred (R. 22 5, 226).
Giorgio's testimony as to the position of the cars on
the highway at the time of the accident was very incon-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

elusive. He never saw the defendant's car until he saw its
headlights just an instant before the accident. He had no
idea how far away the car was (R. 211) .

uQ. As a matter of fact you didn't see the
car you had the collision with until you saw the
headlights, that is the first time you saw the car?
A.

Saw the headlights.

Q.

It was dark enough so you didn't see the
car without those headlights, is that it?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Now, when you saw these headlights,
how far away from you were they?
A. I don't know. Everything went so fast
I just saw the lights and tried to turn and bang, that
is it.

Q.

You never saw these lights until you saw
them the instant before the accident?
A.

That is right.

Q.

You haven't an idea how far away you
were from it?

A.

No," (R. 211).

He tried to turn right, but didn't know whether he
got the car turned or not ( R. 211 ) . He could not say
as to the position of the defendant's car or its lights on the
highway (R. 212) . He guessed his own car was a foot
or two west of the center of the road (R. 204). He testified that his car left no tire marks on the highway (R.
210) , hut that fluid did leak from his power steering
reservoir. (R. 209).
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Burdett testified that he passed one northbound car
as he was proceeding up the south side of Bennion Hill and
passed another car near the top of the hill but did not go
over the center of the road in so doing (R. 314, 315). As
he came down the hill he was on his own side of the road
in the inside lane and did not cross over the center line ( R.
316, 317). He was traveling 50 miles per hour. Eyre
and Massardi started to argue and were jostling him and
interfering with his driving. He momentarily turned his
head to ask them to stop. Then he saw the lights of a car
coming toward him and the collision took place with the
Giorgio car. His car was on its own side of the road at
that time and he did not remember anything thereafter
about any other accjdents. (R. 317).
Massardi did not remember anything about the accident. (R. 231, 247).
Arthur E. Allen, an investigating officer, gave as his
opinion that the impact was approximately two feet into
the southbound lane of traffic, basing the same on the
fluid mark left by the Giorgio vehicle. (R. 170). !-lowever, he admitted on cross examination that in a former
hearing involving this same subject matter, he testified that
the mark was ((one foot west of the center line of the
highway" (R. 172, 174). In this case he actually could
not recall anything definitely except what his notes and
diagram showed (R. 174)). He admitted that Exhibit
No.1 was prepared by him and Deputy Gunn the next day
following the accident when everything was fresh upon
his mind (R. 168, 169). He admitted that the point of
impact as shown on that exhibit was only one foot inside
the southbound lane (R. 172). He said that the fluid
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trom the power steering of the Giorgio car leaked out and
left a mark upon the road, which was shown in Exhibit
No. P-2. This was the only mark which he could identify
as coming from the Giorgio vehicle (R. 170, 171) and
was, therefore, actually the mark on which he based his
measurement as to the point of impact.
Lewis J. Uzelac, an automobile mechanic, testified
that the power steering reservoir on a 1953 Roadmaster
such as was being driven by Giorgio was actually located
29% inches in from the outside edge of the left front
fender. He also testified that it was 22Y2 inches from
the outside edge of the fender to the nearest portion of any
hose leading to or from the power steering reservoir (R.
2 8 8, 2 89) .He further testified that such a car had an apron
extending down from the inside edge of the fender toward
the engine (R. 289) and that if any hose were broken, the
fluid from the hose would run down the apron before
dropping onto the ground (R. 289) . If any break occurred in the hose, it could not be closer than 22 ~lz inches
to the outside edge of the fender and that where the fluid
could drop to the ground would be farther away from
the fender than that (R. 292, 293). If the car was
struck on the left side, the apron would be pushed closer
in to the unit or engine and farther away from the
wheel (R. 293).
Thus the physical evidence showed that the left side
of the Giorgio vehicle at the time of the accident was
at least a foot east of the center line and into the northbound traffic lane because the officer indicated on his
diagram that the fluid mark from the Giorgio vehicle was
one foot west of the center line and the outside edge of the
fender would be at least two feet further to the east.
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The impact beetween the Giorgio and Burdett cars
involved the left front and side of each vehicle. Both
Giorgio and the defendant lost control of their vehicles
following the initial impact. As a matter of fact, Giorgio's
vehicle, according to officer Allen, traveled a distance of
3 34 feet after the impact before stopping (R. 174 and Ex.
I).
Massardi testified she said something about the defendant driving too fast and Eyre replied, ccDon't worry
about that, he is a race car driver" (R. 231, 232). She did
not know whether this remark was made going out to the
ranch or coming back. (R. 248).
On the issue of intoxication, Deputy Sheriff Allen
said that he conversed with the defendant at the scene,
could smell alcohol on him, and that he was irrational.
He believed the defendant to be intoxicated. (R. 148) .
Vasco Laub, a highway patrolman, said he conferred
with the defendant on the night of the accident at about
9:00 P.M. at the hospital (R. 257, 259). He inquired
whether the defendant would be willing to submit to a
blood alcohol test. The defendant allegedly said he
wouldn't take a blood test until he could talk to his attorney (R. 260) . Laub then said:

uQ. Now, I will ask while you were talking
to Mr. Burdett, will you describe his appearance,
or anything you noticed about him in regard to
smell, or anything like that?
A. Yes. After he technically refused to take
a blood alcohol test I leaned close enough so I could
smell his breath and observe his general condition,
the condition of his eyes and his speech. I noticed
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also an impairment of his speech, which I presumed
to be permanent. He also had quite a bit of blood
about his face; I could see he had been injured. I

observed a rather strong odor of alcohol on his
breath and his tongue appeared quite thick, and
his eyes were quite blood shot." (Italics ours)
(R. 261).

He said he had made a study of intoxicants and their effect on people. In his opinion the defendant was intoxicated (R. 262).
The defendant admitted having only two short beers.
(R. 300, 301). Massardi said she and Eyre observed that
Burdett had two drinks of some alcoholic beverage from
a glass while he was in the B Z B in their presence (R.
242). She also admitted that she and Eyre had been with
the defendant for approximately three hours prior to the
time of the accident (R. 2 50) .
Massardi testified that about 4:00 P.M. on the day of
the accident she and Eyre went to a restaurant and had
something to eat (R. 228). They also went to a liquor
store where they purchased a pint of whiskey and a bottle
of 7-Up. There was an empty 7-Up bottle in the car
in which the whiskey and mixer was poured half full, and
they drank the contents therefrom. They then went to a
restaurant to pick up a crate in which to gather some
eggs, and from there to the B Z B Tavern, where they
each ordered a glass of beer. They were sitting at a table
in the B Z B when the defendant came over to them (R.
229).
Defendant said that Massardi and Eyre were drinking
beer at the B Z B. He said they had a bottle in a wrapper
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on the floor (R. 3 00, 3 01). He said that after they left
the B Z B, a fifth of whiskey was purchased at North
Temple and Fifth West (R. 304). At Riverton, at Eyre's
request, defendant bought a small bottle of mixer and gave
it to Eyre (R. 3 06) . On the return trip, the defendant
stopped in Riverton to buy another bottle of mixer for
Eyre (R. 310) . Massardi did not know whether Eyre
took the bottle of whiskey with them into the B Z B
(R. 241). She admitted testifying in another proceeding
that she could have drunk some alcoholic beverage on the
trip from the B Z B to Draper and that she and Eyre
could have had something to drink at the ranch (R. 246,
247). She admitted testifying in a former trial that she
had had a few drinks (R. 2 52) .
In addition to the argument which defendant said
took place between Eyre and Massardi just before the
accident, defendant also testified that on the trip back
from the ranch he had stopped for a semaphore in West
Jordan and after he started up, Eyre and Massardi had
argued. At that time he told them to stop so he could
drive the car. They did, and he continued on north
(R. 313, 314). Massardi at first denied that Eyre had
made any statement that had caused an argument between
them, but admitted testifying at a former hearing on
that matter that Eyre might have made some remark on
the way back that tnade her mad (R. 254, 25 5).
The defendant testified that not only did he drive
Eyre and Massardi out to the ranch, but on arrival there,
he gathered the eggs and fed the chickens (R. 3 07, 3 08) .
Neither Eyre nor Massardi at any time complained or protested about the nature of his driving the car or the manSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ner in which he was handling it (R. 319) . He denied
exceeding the speed limit (R. 320) . His lights were proerly burning (R. 320). Traffic wasn't heavy in the
direction in which he was proceeding (R. 327). Massardi would not deny that the defendant gathered the
eggs (R. 244) or that he fed the chickens (R. 24 5.)
She remembered testifying in a former trial that the defendant was not driving in an erratic or reckless manner
on the return trip (R. 248).

ARGUMENT
We will consider the plaintiff's points in the order
set forth in the plantiff's brief.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, CECIL DREWERY EYRE, WAS A GUEST
IN THE BURDETT AUTOMOBILE.
The plaintiff has cited numerous authorities holding
that the compensation required to remove an occupant
from the status of a guest does not need to be a monetary
one, but that any tangible benefit which is the 1nOtivating influence for furnisbing the transportation is sufficient. We have no quarrel with this statement of the law.
However, in each of the cases cited, there was in fact not
only an actual benefit to the driver, but that benefit was
the motivating influence for the fur1tishing of the transportation. We will not attempt to cover all of the cases
cited in the plaintiff's brief because a reading of the brief
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will clearly show that in the cases cited both factors were
present.
For example, in the Utah case of Jensen v. Mower,
294 P. 2d 683, 4 Utah 2d 336, the defendant, prior to the
accident, had posted on a bulletin board at Hill Field a
notice that he wanted riders from Salt Lake City, in
response to which the plaintiff contacted the defendant
and was advised that the defendant charged $3.50 per
week, which was the amount charged by the bus, and that
the plaintiff would be required to pay whether he rode
or not as long as the car went. In other words, as the
Utah Supreme Court so aptly stated:
ccin this case appellant did not offer to give
respondent transportation from Salt Lake City to
Hill field as his guest. APpellant 1nade it crystal

clear that if respondent rode with him that it would
be on the terms named by appellant for, the price he
named and if respondent didn't like it he knew
what he could do." (Italics ours).
In Kruzie v. Sanders (Cal.), 143 P. 2d 704, the defendant requested the plaintiff to accompany her on
a shopping tour to assist in the selection of a ring as a
present for defendant's husband and also for her help in
choosing presents for some other girls. After nearly a

week's urging, the plaintiff went with the defendant for
this sole pur pose.
The case of Crawford v. Foster (Cal.), 293 P. 841,
involved a case where a salesman for the defendant automobile dealer was demonstrating a vehicle to the plaintiff
as a prospective purchaser.
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In Whitechat v. Guyette (Cal.), 122 P. 2d 47, the
driver actually received money from an organization to
which he and the plaintiff belonged to take the plaintiff
and others to an organization meeting.
In Druzanich v. Criley (Cal.), 122 P. 2d 53, the
defendant's husband permitted her to use his car in going
to a Union convention if the Plaintiff and others would
help in the driving, which they agreed to do.
In Walker v. Adamson (Cal.), 70 P. 2d 914, the
plantiff and defendant were business associates and owned
property on Lake Tahoe which they rented out. The
purpose of the trip was to take hardware and other materials to carpenters who were doing construction work
on the property. The defendant took his car and the
plaintiff furnished part of the expenses.
In Gillespie v. Rawlings (Cal.), 317 P. 2d 601, the
sole purpose for which the plaintiff was riding in the
defendant's car was to familiarize herself with the defendant's business so that she could talk intelligently with
defendant's customers.
In Roberts v. Craig (Dist. Ct. of App. 1st Dist. Div.
1, Cal.), 268 P. 2d 500, the plaintiff, a licensed driver, was
riding in the defendant's vehicle at his request because
defendant only had a learner's permit and the law required
her to have a licensed driver in the car when she drove.
In Russell v. Pilger (Vt.), 37 A. 2d 403, the plaintiff,
a law officer, was riding in the defendant,s milk truck to
protect him during a milk strike.
In Wittrock v. Newcom (Iowa), 277 N. W. 286,
the defendant, an auto salesman, requested the plaintiff
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to accompany him to assist in selling a car to the plaintiff's
brother.
An analysis of each case cited by plaintiff clearly
shows that the plaintiff in each case was requested by the
defendant to accompany the defendant for a specified purpose which was the motivating influence of the trip.
Neither we nor the trial court contended that the
compensation must be in money. Both recognized that
there must be a tangible benefit to the defendant and that

such benefit must be the motivating influence of t!Jc trip.
The plaintiff had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative allegation in the complaint that the deceased Eyre was a passenger for hire. See
Ames v. Seibert (Ohio), 99 N. E. 2d 905; Miller v. Miller
(Ill.), 69 N. E. 2d 878; Pilcher v. E.rny (Kan.), 124 P.
2d 461.
It was and is our position that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was any tangible benefit to the defendant;
or, if there was any such benefit, that it was the motivating
influence of the trip. It was upon this basis that the
trial court ruled that Eyre was a guest.
The only evidence presented in the case on the purpose of the trip or the sale of eggs was that given by
Massardi and the defendant. The d~fendant positively
testified that he had purchased a quarter of a case of eggs
from the deceased Eyre which were to be delivered to him
by Eyre at the B Z B Tavern (R. 303). The remaining
three-quarters of the case of eggs was admittedly purchased by another bar tender and the proprietor of the
bar. The defendant said it made no difference on the price
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whether he drove out to the ranch and picked them up
or in whose car they might have gone (R. 3 51) . Defendant intended on going home until the deceased Eyre
invited him out to the ranch. Having time on his hands,
he decided to go ( R. 3 0 3, 3 12) . Massardi did not refute
any of these statements.
In order to prove that the deceased Eyre was a passenger for hire, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that in selling the
eggs to the defendant and as a condition thereof, it was
agreed that the defendant would drive Eyre out to the
ranch and get the eggs. To say the least, the proof would
have to show some request by defendant that Eyre accompany him so that he could get the eggs. Such is the
reasoning back of all of the authorities cited in the plaintiff's brief. There was not one scintilla of evidence to
show that, as a part of the purchase price, the defendant
had to drive the deceased Eyre out to the ranch to get
the eggs or even requested Eyre to go with him for this
purpose. In fact, all of the evidence proved directly to
the contrary. In the first place, Massardi said she and
Eyre went out to the ranch every day to feed the chickens
and gather eggs (R. 238). They were enroute to the
chicken farm to gather eggs and feed the chickens when
they stopped in at the B Z B Tavern. This was their
intention before anything was said about the sale of eggs.
Massardi didn't even know the defendant had a car
when the three of them left the tavern (R. 230). When
they left the tavern, according to Massardi, it was their
intention of going in Eyre's car (R. 23 8). Her testimony
definitely fails to show that the sale of eggs had anything
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to do with the trip, or was part of the purchase price, or
in any event the motivating influence for the defendant
taking Eyre in his car, or even that the defendant made
any request that Eyre accompany him so that he could
get the eggs. In the second place, Mrs. Massardi testified
that when the three of them left the tavern, she and Eyr'e

walked over toward Eyre's car and the defendant totvard
his and that the defendant then invited them to go in his
car (R. 230):

u.A.

Well, I don't know just how long we
were in there, we then started to leave and went
outside, and Mr. Eyre and I started to his car, Mr.
Burdett's was parked next to it, I didn't know at
that time Mr. Burdett had a car. He said to Jack
(let's go in mine,' so we got in his car and went."
Ohviously, if one of the terms of the sale and purchase of the eggs was that the defendant had to drive
the deceased Eyre out to the ranch to get the eggs, or
if defendant had requested Eyre to accompany him, Eyre
and Massardi would have gone direct to the defendant's
car. In the third place, the defendant testified that the
price had been agreed upon and that the eggs were to be
delivered by Eyre to the B Z B Tavern. In the fourth
place, as they were leaving the tavern, and got to the
door, Eyre asked if the defendant would like to go along
(R. 303). This certainly negatives any duty on the part
of the defendant to pick up the eggs or that the defendant
had even requestd Eyre to accompany him for that purpose.
The fact that there may have been a business transaction between the deceased Eyre and the defendant relaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive to the sale and purchase of eggs cannot in and of
itself transform what otherwise was a purely social trip
into a business venture unless the trip itself was agreed
upon as a part of the purchase and sale of the eggs. See
Ames vs. Seibert (Ohio), 99 N. E. 2d 905. In that case
the plaintiff had driven his car from his home to Beach
City where his father resided and was enroute to Wilmot,
a village about three and a half miles beyond Beach City,
to take his car there to have it repaired by a friend, Seibert. The plaintiff had his father follow him to Wilmot
in order to drive him back to Beach City after he had delivered the car to Seibert. A conversation ensued between the plaintiff and Seibert about the repairs, in which
the plaintiff stated that he would like to have the repairs
completed the next day. Seibert indicated that if the
plaintiff would help him tear down the car that evening,
he would have it fixed for him. The plaintiff said he
would help tear it down, whereupon Seibert told the
plaintiff's father to go home and that he, Seibert, would
bring the plaintiff home after they were through work.
Pursuant to this conversation and after the car had been
torn down, Seibert started to drive the plaintiff back to
Beach City when an accident occurred in which Seibert
was killed and the plaintiff injured. The plaintiff brought
an action against Seibert's estate for the injuries sustained.
Plaintiff claimed that he was a passenger. for hire because
his aid and assistance in working on the car was for Seibert's benefit, and that in return for this benefit, Seibert
had agreed to drive the plaintiff home. In holding that
the plain tiff, as a matter of law, was a guest, the Ohio
Appellate Court stated that it was uincumbent upon the
plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
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he had paid or furnished to Seibert some pecuniary consideration for his transportation, as such."
uDid this arrangement create a contract for
transportation with payment therefor? In the
opinion of this court it did not. If Seibert had requested Ames to help him tear down the car of a
third person for which Seibert was to receive the
entire payment for repairs, a different question
would be presented. Here, there 1vas no evidence
that an agreed lump sum payment was to be made
by Ames to Seibert for tbe repair. of the car or that
Ames was to be repaid a portion of such contract
price for his assistance. Such evidence was necessary to show that Ames was to be compensated by
Seibert for Ames' assistance. The evidence does
not show the rendering of any service to Seibert by
this arrangement. In fact, the arrangement was
made so that Ames could have his own car by the
next evening, and, his service, if any, was contributed to the repair of his own car for that purpose. Furthermore, the statement of Seibert to
Ames' father that he should go home and not wait
for Ames, and that he, Seibert, would bring Ames
home, raises an inference that Seibert was making
the trip to accommodate the father. At any rate
there was no evidence or inference of fact to the
effect that either Ames or Seibert had formed any
intent that Ames was to compensate Seibert for
this short ride of three or three and a half miles.
The most that can be inferred from the testimony
is that Seibert took Ames home as a courtesy between friends. There is no evidence to prove a contract to pay for transportation and the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict should have been
sustained." (Italics ours)
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SeealsoPilcherv. Erny (Kan.), 124P. 2d 461. The
plaintiff was a seamstress whom the defendant had invited
to accompany him on a trip to Stafford, prior to which
time the defendant had left a coat with the plaintiff in
order that she might fix it for him. When the defendant
called for the coat, he offered to pay her the agreed charge
of $1.2 5 therefor, but the plaintiff refused to accept
any money saying that she would let the cost of
repairs go on her expenses on the contemplated trip.
The plaintiff sustained injuries on the trip, for which
The plaintiff contended
she sued the defendant.
that the benefit which she had given the defendant
of not charging him for the re pairs to his coat made
her a passenger for hire. The defendant argued that
the real motivating cause of having the plaintiff in
his car was a desire on his part to be accommodating and
to extend a courtesy to her; that the transaction with reference to the coat was only incidental. A judgment had
been entered in favor of the plaintiff which was reversed
by the appellate court with directions to enter judgment
for the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff had
the burden of establishing that she was a passenger for
hire and that as a matter of law the payment was not the
motivating cause for the trip.
See also Melcher v. Adams (Ore.) , 146 P. 2d 3 54. In
that case the plaintiff, who was a friend of the defendant,
had been invited along for a ride. The plaintiff actually
helped the defendant lift certain gear in and out of the
automobile and contended that it was a benefit, which
took him out of the guest statute. The Oregon Supreme
Court in the course of its opinion said:
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uThe: supreme court of the state of Washington has adopted the rule that in order to take
out of the guest category one who rides in the
motor vehicle of another, <two requirements are
necessary: ( 1) An actual or potential benefit in
a material or business sense resulting or to result
to the owner, and ( 2) that the transportation be
motivated by the expectation of such benefit' ::- * *
((Upon consideration of the entire evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we are
of the opinion that the assistance which the plaintiff rendered the defendant in helping him lift the
gear into and out of the automobile was not a substantial benefit to the defendant in a material or
business sense; and that the expectation of such
act of the plaintiff was not the defendant's reason
for inviting the plaintiff to drive to the beach, nor
was it the plaintiff's purpose in accompanying the
defendant."
There is no disagreement among the authorities as
to the general principles governing the determination of
one status as guest or passenger. The courts generally hold
that a mere incidental benefit resulting to the driver from
the transportation is not sufficient to enlarge his liability,
but that the benefit must have been given as consideratio11,

for the transportation and, in some degree at least, have
induced the defendant to extend the offer.
In this case the sale of the eggs and purchase price,
according to the evidence, had already been agreed upon
before there was any discussion about riding to the ranch.
The plaintiff failed to prove that as a part of the consideration for the purchase of the eggs the defendant had
to drive Eyre out to the ranch. The lower court had no
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alternative but to find that the deceased Eyre was a guest.
Jurors cannot resort to speculation and conjecture. To
have submitted Eyre's status as passenger or guest to a
jury under the evidence. in this case would have been
clearly error. The jury could not possibly have found
that part of the consideration for the purchase of the eggs
was the defendant's driving Eyre out to the ranch, or
that the defendant requested Eyre to accompany him so
that he could get some eggs.
Plaintiff in his brief argues that getting the eggs that
night and at a favorable price was a substantial enough
benefit for the defendant to have considered it worth his
time in driving out to get the eggs. What the defendant
may have considered as being a benefit to him is of no
concern. The question is, was the getting of the eggs on
that night and at that price the motivating influence for
the trip? O·n this the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence. There was no evidence that the defendant ever
wanted the eggs that night, or requested Eyre to accompany him for that purpose. If the defendant had wanted
the eggs that night it was still not necessary for him to
drive Eyre. Eyre was already going out to the ranch in his
own car. What possible difference could it have made to
the defendant whether he went with Eyre, or Eyre with
him, or whether they went in their own cars. Furthermore, the only testimony in the case is that it was Eyre
who invited the defendant. There is absolutely no evidence that the defendant requested Eyre to accompany
him so that he could get the eggs that night. Any benefit
to the defendant was purely incidental.
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Plaintiff also argues that there was no social purpose
whatsoever in this trip because they were not very well
acquainted with one another. Such an argument might
have more appeal in a case where there had been no drinking. It is common knowledge that people who are drinking in taverns become more sociable with one another and,
in fact, very friendly with persons with whom they may
have even slight or no acquaintance. Furthermore, even
though there was no social purpose involved, this in and
of itself would not make the deceased Eyre a passenger for
hire. It was still incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove
that the furnishing of the eggs to the defendant was the
real motivating influence of the defendant's taking deceased Eyre out to the ranch. Reference is made in the
plaintiff's brief to the fact that at a former hearing the
defendant did not make any statement that he was interested in going out to see the farm. Ho~rever, in this connection the plaintiff's attorney quoted only a portion of
the testimony given by the defendant in the former trial.
The defendant also testified in that former hearing, in
response to question from plaintiff's counsel:
((Well, Mr. Eyre, he asked if I would like to accompany them out to the ranch to get the eggs. I
didn't have anything pressing at the time to do so I
told him I would be glad to and then I asked him,
(which car shall we take? Shall we go in mine or
shall we go in yours,' and he said they would go in
my car." (R. 351).
The defendant's testimony at the former trial, therefore, clearly indicated that he had been invited by the
deceased Eyre to go to the ranch and that he accepted the
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ly, by no stretch of the imagination, could show that the
purchase of the eggs was the motivating influence of the
trip. The only reason for his going, as he testified in the
former hearing and at this trial, was because he was invited
by the deceased Eyre to accompany him and not because
there was any obligation on him, nor because he had requested Eyre to accompany him so that they could pick
up the eggs.
Not only did the plaintiff fail to prove that any
benefit to the defendant was the motivating influence of
the trip, but he also failed to prove that the defendant received any benefit from the trip. The purchase price of
the eggs had already been agreed upon before any invitation
was extended. This is clear from both Massardi and the
defendant's testimony because when they left the tavern,
Massardi and Eyre walked over to Eyre's car and the
defendant to his, and it was only then that there was any
discussion about whose car they would ride in and it clearly could not have been part of any business transaction.
The sale of the eggs had been complete and was agreed
upon. Thereupon Eyre asked the defendant if he would
like to go out with them. The defendant then suggested
they go in his car. He received no benefit whatsoever. He
would have got the eggs and for the same price whether he
went out or not. Actually, the benefit was all the other
way. Eyre had to go to the ranch anyway, and on arrival
at the ranch the defendant had to gather all of the eggs and
feed the chickens.
Plaintiff states that it is a known fact that persons
will travel many miles to participate in a bargain sale.
\V" e serious! y doubt that anyone could sustain any benefit
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from the purchase of a quarter of a case of eggs if he had
to drive out to Draper and back from Salt Lake City to
get them and, in addition, while there, feed the chickens
and gather the eggs.
In this case the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant received any benefit or, if any benefit was
received, the plaintiff completely failed to establish that
such benefit was the motivating influence of the trip. The
primary purpose of the trip to the farm was to enable Eyre
and Massardi to feed the chickens and gather the eggs as
they always did. The defendant was invited to accompany them, and as an act of courtesy offered to take his
car. The fact that he might get the eggs that night was
purely incidental. There was no testimony that he needed
or even wanted them that night. And there was no
thought of his ever going to the farm until he was invited
by Eyre to do so. Since the plaintiff had the burden of
proving not only a benefit to the defendant, but that such
benefit was the motivating influence of the trip, the lower
court properly held that the deceased Eyre was a guest.
POINT II
INSTRUCTIO,N NO. 15 PROPERLY ALLOWED
THE. JURY TO CONSIDER ALLEGED SCUFFLING
BY DECEDENT AND ANOTHER OCCUPANT AS A
DEFENSE.
There was evidence in the case that just prior to the
accident the decedent and Massardi started arguing and
scuffling so as to interfere with the defendant's operation
of the car; that he momentarily turned just long enough
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to tell them to stop when he saw the Giorgio automobile
coming toward him (R. 317). Massardi admitted that
Eyre may have said something that made her mad (R. 254,
2 55). She did not otherwise refute the defendant's testimony as to the scuffling and seemed to remember very
little of what happened. Mrs. Eyre testified that she and
her husband had separated four or five times prior to
their divorce, and that the reason both for the divorce and
the separations was her husband's drinking and that when
he drank, 4e became quarrelsome. (R. 265, 266, 274).
There was evidence that all three parties had been drinking prior to the accident.
The plaintiff attempted to prove and argued to the
jury that the impact between the Giorgio and the defendant's car occurred when the defendant's vehicle was partially on the wrong side of the road. Two objections are
made to the instruction, the first, that since the defendant
testified the accident occurred on his own side of the road,
the scuffling could not have caused him to go on the
wrong side of the road; the second, that since the defendant
stated the oncoming car turned into his car suddenly, he
did not have time to do anything about it. The plaintiff
then says that any Jcuffling had nothing to do with the
accident. We would agree with the plaintiff, if the plaintiff would admit that the accident occurred on the defendant's side of the road and that the Giorgio car turned
suddenly into the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff did
not so admit but, in fact, claimed that. the accident occurred on Giorgio's side of the road and that Giorgio did
not swerve over toward the defendant. An issue was,
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dant did cross over onto the wrong side of the road or
whether Giorgio turned over onto the defendant's side of
the road. Obviously, the defendant was entitled to have
the jury instructed on all phases of the case. If the jury
found, as the plaintiff contended, that the defendant
edged or turned over onto the wrong side of the road, then
the jury was entitled to consider whether such edging or
turning was proximately caused by the scuffling that took
place between Massardi and the deceased. The plaintiff
cannot accept the defendant's testimony as true and
undisputed on this point, when his whole case was based
on the exact opposite of what the defendant said.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY O·N DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiff complains that the court should not
have defined negligence, since negligence was eliminated
as a basis of recovery_
Instruction No. 4 was a stock instruction in which
the court defined the terms negligence, contributory negligence, ordinary care, and proximate cause. It was, of
course, necessary to instruct the jury as to the meaning
of wilful misconduct. This was covered in the court's
instruction No. 5 wherein the court properly instructed
as follows:
(Wilful misconduct' connotes a greater
wrongdoing than mere negligence. As used in
these instructions it means intentional wrongful
conduct, done with knowledge that serious injury
c:c
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to the guest is a probable result. It involves deliberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing
or omitting to do an act with knowledge that injury is likely to result therefrom." (Italics ours)
This definition was approved by the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of Stack v. Kearnes, 221 P. 2d. 594, 118
Utah 237. The first sentence of that instruction refers
to the term ((negligence" and states that wilful misconduct connotes a greater wrongdoing than mere negligence. Obviously, if this sentence of the instruction is to
have any meaning to the jury, negligence must be defined. In instruction No. 16 the court instructed the
jury that even if it should find that the defendant was
negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident, this was not sufficient-that the jury
must find that the defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct or intoxication. Again, if that instruction was
to have any meaning the jury must know the definition
of negligence. In other words, how could a jury decide
that the defendant's conduct was only negligent as distinguished from wilful misconduct without knowing what
negligence was? The definition of negligence was not
extraneous to the issues and evidence.
Under this point the plaintiff also excepts to the
court's Instruction No. 7 wherein the court instructed
that it was the duty of a driver to keep a lookout, to keep
his car under control, to drive on his own side of the highway, and to maintain a safe speed, the court adding that a
violation of any of these requirements would constitute
negligence. The court then stated that in order for the
plaintiff to prevail on his claim of wilful misconduct he
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had the burden of proving that the aforementioned acts of
negligence were committed under such circumstances as
to constitute wilful misconduct. This instruction embodied the substance of the language Judge Wade used
in his dissenting opinion in Esernia v. Overland Moving
Co., 206 P. 2d 621, 115 Ut. 519, wherein he said:
uunder such a state of facts, in my opinion, it
became a question for the jury to determine

whether such negligence was wilful misconduct
as required under our guest statute for recovery * * * ."
Under this point complaint is also made of the court's
Instruction No. 11 to the effect that conduct arising
from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or from
error of judgment, standing alone, did not indicate wilful
misconduct. This instruction is likewise a proper statement of the law. In the case of Ricciuti v. Robinson, 269
P. 2d 282, 2 Utah 2d. 45, the Supreme Court cited with
approval the cases of Bashor v. Bashor (Colo.) , 8 5 P. 2d
732; Neyens v. Gehl (Iowa), 15 N. W. 2d 888; and Rindge
v. Holbrook (Conn.), 149 A. 231, in each of which it was
held that mere momentary thoughtlessness or inadvertence
did not constitute wilful misconduct. In the Bashor case
the driver, while traveling 45 to 55 miles per hour, momentarily withdrew his attention from the road while turning
a radio dial. In the Neyens case the driver, while traveling
at a speed of 50 to 60 miles per hour, sought to retrieve
a lighted cigarette he had dropped. In the Rindge case
the driver momentarily lost control when a bee flew in
the car. The same principle was applied in the Ricciuti
case by our Supreme Court when the driver lost control
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of his car while attempting to retrieve a lighted cigarette
which had fallen on the mouth of his girl friend, who
was sleeping with her head on his lap. This instruction
was proper in view of defendant's testimony that when
Massardi and Eyre started to scuffle, he momentarily
turned toward them to tell them to stop.
See also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
and Practice, Part 1, Section 2322, at page 379, wherein
it is said:
ccConduct arising from a merely momentary
thoughtlessness or inadvertence or from an error
of judgment does not manifest a reckless disregard
for the rights of others so as to serve as a basis for
recovery by an injured automobile guest."
And also at page 3 86 where it is said:
uMere negligence is not sufficient, nor is momentary thoughtlessness or inadvertence, * ::· * ."
There was no confusion in the court's instructions.
The same properly submitted to the jury the distinction
between negligence and wilful misconduct, together with
a definition of what did and did not constitute wilful
misconduct and that the plaintiff could not recover upon
a mere showing of negligence.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
ON THE ISSUE OF INTOXICATION.
Under this point no complaint is made as to the
definitio'n of intoxication, but because the court instructed
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that one who was driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor is guilty of negligence as a matter of
law. The court had, however, made it clear in Instruction No. 1 that the plaintiff Eyre claimed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
which was denied by the defendant, and in Instruction
No. 7 had clearly instructed that under the guest law a
guest could recover where the driver was intoxicated.
Again in that instruction the court outlined the plaintiff
Eyre's claims and specifically stated: ((If the plaintiffs
should prevail in your finding as to either the issue of
intoxication or that of wilful misconduct as a proximate
cause of injuries or damages suffered by them, they will
be entitled to recover damages ~· ~to ~z- ."
Again in Instruction No. 16, although the court instructed the jury that mere negligence was not sufficient
on which to base a recovery, the court specifically instructed that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover if the
defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct or was intoxicated. Certainly, considering the instructions as a whole,
there could be no question in the jury's mind that it could
find for the plaintiff if it believed the defendant to be
intoxicated. This is further indicated by the court's instruction No. 14 to the jury that a guest who rides in a
vehicle, knowing or having reason to know, that the
driver is intoxicated, assumes that hazard and cannot in
that event recover from the driver's intoxication.

POIINT

v

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT .COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRO·R IN ALLO·WING THE DEFENSE
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OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO BE GIVEN TO THE
JURY OR IN UNDULY EMPHASIZING THE SAME.
There are two phases to the court's instructions on
assumption of risk as set forth in the plaintiff's brief.
One as to intoxication and the other as to wilful misconduct.
On the first issue the court in Instruction No. 14
said in substance and effect that a guest who knows or
reasonably should know that the driver is intoxicated,
assumes the hazard resulting from the driver's intoxication. Also, that if, having entered a vehicle, a guest learns,
or reasonably should be aware, that the driver is intoxicated, and having a reasonable opportunity to alight at
a reasonably safe place, fails to do so, the guest then assumes the risk incident to the driver's intoxication by
continuing to ride in the car. There can be no question
that this instruction contains a proper statement of the
law. It is in substance and effect the same principle as
involved in the Esernia v. Overland Moving Company
case, 206 P. 2d 621, 115 Ut. 519, wherein the Supreme
Court held that guests who were aware of the driver's
drowsiness when they accepted the ride and further when
the truck ran off the road the first time and who had
no opportunity thereafter to leave when the truck stopped
at other points, had assumed the risk as a matter of law.
The evidence in this case on the intoxication of the
parties was conflicting. The defendant admitted having
consumed only two short beers (R. 300, 301). Massardi
testified that she and Eyre saw Burdett have two glasses
of alcoholic beverages to drink. She could not state
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whether the drink was whiskey or beer (R. 242). However, with reference to the defendant's condition, the
plaintiff had two peace officers positively testify that
the defendant was intoxicated. (R. 148, 259, 261). The
evidence showed without dispute that Massardi and Eyre
had purchased a pint of whiskey before joining the defendant and had each drunk some of the whiskey before
joining him. (R. 229). The defendant testified that
they brought this whiskey into the B Z B Tavern with
then1.
(R. 3 00, 3 01). He also testified that after the
three of them left the tavern, he purchased a fifth of
whiskey at the instance of the deceased Eyre (R. 3 04)
and thereafter purchased mixer on the trip down at Riverton (R. 306) and another bottle of mixer on the trip
back (R. 310) . Massardi admitted that she testified in a
previous hearing she had had a few drinks and that there
rna y have been other drinking ( R. 2 52) .
Counsel in his brief argues that the deceased Eyre
had no notice of the drinking on the part of the defendant, particularly because the defendant testified under
oath that he was sober. This argument might have sounded a truer note if the plaintiff had not attempted to
prove by two witnesses that the defendant was not sober
but was, in fact, intoxicated. With such testimony certainly the jury could have found that the defendant was
intoxicated, notwithstanding his own testimony that he
was sober. This was exactly what· the plaintiff sought to
have the jury do. The evidence clearly shows that both
the deceased Eyre and Massardi were in the presence of
the defendant continuously for approximately three hours
prior to the time of the accident, during all of which time
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they clearly had an opportunity to observe what alcohol
he may have consumed. If two investigating officers who
only saw the defendant for a few minutes after the accident could positively state that he was intoxicated, then
both the deceased and Massardi, who had been with him
continuously for three hours prior to the accident, either
knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have
known of the intoxication.
We did not take the position in the trial below, nor
do we now take the position that the defendant was perfectly sober. We then stated to the jury and so state now
that possibly there was more drinking than either of the
parties admitted, but that whatever drinking was involved, it was done in the presence and with the acquiescence of Eyre. The issue of assumption of risk on
intoxication was therefore a proper one.
Plaintiff in his brief refers to Shoemaker v. Floor,
117 Utah 434, 217 P. 2d 382. In that case this court
specifically held that whether the guest had assumed the
risk in connection with the driver's intoxication was a
question of fact.
The other phase of assumption of risk had to do with
the defendant's conduct wholly apart from intoxication.
However, even though the jury may not have found the
defendant intoxicated, it was entitled to consider on the
issue of wilful misconduct the fact that the defendant
had been drinking. The plaintiff attempted to prove that
the defendant was driving at a high rate of speed and
crossed over the center line after coming down the north
slope of Bennion Hill, colliding with the Giorgio vehicle;
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that the defendant was not keeping a proper lookout and
failed to have his vehicle under control. Most of these alleged actions would constitute mere negligence and not be
sufficient for a recovery unless considered in connection
with the defendant's alleged drinking, whether it actually
amounted to intoxication or not. The evidence also
showed that either on the trip down or back Massardi had
made some mention about the defendant's speeding, to
which the deceased Eyre replied not to worry because
the defendant was a race car driver (R. 231, 232).
If this occurred on the trip down, then both she and Eyre
assumed the risk by failing to get out when they had the
opportunity either at Riverton or on arrival at the ranch.
Her testimony indicates that Eyre fully acquiesced as
to the manner in which the defendant's vehicle was being
operated. As further bearing upon the issue of assumption
of risk, apart from the intoxication, was the scuffling
episode which took place just before the accident occurred,
and the fact that Eyre at no time complained or protested
as to the manner in which the vehicle was being operated.
On this phase of the matter the court gave two
separate instructions, the same being Nos. 12 and 13,
which in effect instructed the jury that even though
they found the defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct,
the jury would then have to determine whether the plaintiffs assumed the risk. These instructions properly set
forth the law on assumption of risk. For a person to
manifest his assent to h~gh speed when the same was
called to his attention by merely indicating not to worry,
that the driver was a race car driver, manifest a consent to
a dangerous conduct. Furthermore, knowledge on the
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part of Eyre as to the nature and extent of any drinking
by the defendant, whether it resulted in intoxication or
not, was sufficient, coupled with this incident of alleged
racing, to entitle th~ jury to find that Eyre assumed the
risk of the manner in which the vehicle was being operated. Certainly there was enough evidence in the case on
the question of assumption of risk when coupled with the
fact that no complaints or protests were made by either
Eyre or Massardi, to make an issue of fact for the jury.
Even in the case of Stack v. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221
P. 2d 594, this court held that there was an issue of fact
on assumption of risk which was properly submitted to the
jury and this court refused to reverse the jury's finding
thereon. The court did not state as a matter of law that
the plaintiff had not assumed the risk, but merely that a
jury question was involved. We have the same situation in
our present case. A jury question was involved, appropriate instructions were given, and the jury found against
the plaintiff. There was no reversible error.
Plaintiff complains that three separate instructions
were given on assumption of risk. There were two phases
of this question, assumption of risk in connection with
wilful misconduct and assumption of risk in connection
with intoxication. Instructions on each of these phases
were essential. The court gave only one instruction on
assumption of risk in connection with the intoxication,
but two instructions in connection "rith wilful misconduct, neither of which was in conflict "'"ith one another
and the giving of which could not amount to prejudicial
error. As a n1atter of fact, the court in several instances
repeatedly advised the jury that they could find for the
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plaintiffs in the event of wilful misconduct or intoxication. In instruction No. 1, the court in two separate
places informed the jury that both the plaintiff Massardi
and the plaintiff Eyre claimed that they were entitled to
recover because of wilful misconduct and intoxication
and that the defendant denied he was guilty of wilful misconduct or that he was intoxicated. Instruction No. 5
defined wilful misconduct and Instruction No. 6 gave
the elements necessary to find intoxication. Instruction
No.7 indicated that a guest could recover for wilful misconduct or intoxication, and in addition thereto, reiterated the claims of the respective plaintiffs that the
defendant was intoxicated and. guilty of wilful misconduct and informed the jury that if the plaintiffs should
prevail as to either the issue of intoxication or wilful misconduct, they were entitled to damages. Again, in Instruction No. 16, the court advised the jury that the
plaintiffs could recover for wilful misconduct or intoxication. We submit that the court repeatedly indicated to
the jury that the issues involved wilful misconduct and
intoxication and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on either or both of these bases. The giving of the
instructions on assumption of risk in connection with
either the intoxication or the wilful misconduct was not
confusing or misleading to the jury and did not constitute
any reversible error.
POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT CO~NTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTIO·N
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

BASED ON WILFUL MISCONDUCT AND INTOXICATION.
This is a new ground, nowhere stated in the plaintiff's
statement of points as required under the rules (R. 134,
13 5 ) . For this reason alone this point is entitled to no
consideration. However, we consider it trivial in any
event and certainly not prejudicial error. In Instruction
No. 7 the court stated:
If the plaintiffs should prevail in your
finding as to either the issue of intoxication or that
of wilful misconduct as a proximate cause of injuries or damages suffered by them, they will be entitled to recover damages unless they, or either of
them, are barred from relief by contributory negligence, if any, or by an assumption of the risk, if
such there was under the instructions given you."
cc::. ::· ::·

The complaint is made of this instruction on the ground
that contributory negligence is no defense to an action for
wilful misconduct. Assuming for the sake of argument
that this is a correct statement of the law, nonetheless
there was no prejudicial error. The only conduct of which
complaint was made or which was shown in the evidence
was the failure to complain or protest as to the defendant's driving, riding with a person whom he knew or,
in the exercise of due care, should have known was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, or at least had been
drinking, acquiescing in the operation of a vehicle at a
high rate of speed and justifying the same b,ecause the
defendant was a race car driver, and scuffling between
the deceased and Massardi which interfered with the
driver's control of the vehicle. This was the conduct on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
which it was claimed that the deceased was precluded
from recovery, regardless of any wilful misconduct or
intoxication on the part of the defendant. This conduct,
regardless of what name or style called - contributory
negligence or assumption of risk- was sufficient, if
believed by the jury, to preclude the plaintiff from
recovertng.
The fact that the court used the term contributory
negligence could in no manner have prejudiced the plaintiff because the only conduct on which there was any evidence in the case was sufficient to preclude a recovery on
the plaintiff's part if, in fact, believed by the jury. There
has been confusion in the courts, including our own Supreme Court, on the use of the term contributory negligence in describing the plaintiff's conduct under our own
guest statute. We refer in particular to the case of Esernia
v. Overland Moving Company, 206 P. 2d 621, which was
decided under our guest statute. In that case both parties
and the court in speaking of the guest's conduct, used
the term ((contributory negligence" and in the article
referred to from the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
again in speaking of the guest conduct, the term ((contributory negligence" was used. However, in that case,
as in this, it makes little difference by what term the
conduct is characterized. The plaintiff's actions in the
Esernia case in riding with a person known to be sleepy
would bar the plaintiff's recovery for an accident occurring when the driver went to sleep whether the term contributory negligence or some other term. were used in describing the conduct. So in our case, the conduct of the
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plaintiff of which complaint was made, was sufficient to
preclude such a recovery regardless of the term or name
by which it was designated.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully sumitted that the plaintiff was accorded a full and a fair trial; that the jury was properly
instructed on the issues of law presented by the evidence;
that there was no prejudice at all accorded to the defendant in the court's instructions. The jury's verdict should,
therefore, be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,

RICH & STRONG
Attorneys fer Defendant and
Respondent
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